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1 Introduction
There is a widespread belief that innovation activities of young, small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) might constitute the main driver of technological change and future
growth (Veugelers, 2008; Schneider and Veugelers, 2010; Czarnitzki and Delanote, 2013).
The increased attention from both scholars and policy makers towards these firms is not
only rooted in the expectation of a potential direct contribution to economic growth, but also
because of their expected indirect positive effects on large incumbent firms and their abil-
ity to create new markets. However, even among young SMEs the potential to successfully
innovate may be heterogeneous. The effects on growth for example have been found to be
most important in high-tech sectors. Audretsch (1995) for example, following upon Dunne
et al. (1988) who found differences in growth rates across different industries, touches upon
the importance of sectoral differentiation. The small start-ups active in a highly innovative
environment seem to perform better than the ones in a low-tech environment. In this line of
research, Westhead and Cowling (1995) and Almus and Nerlinger (1999) found that the new
technology based firms (NTBFs), i.e. independent, young firms in high-tech sectors, showed
the highest growth rates. Increasingly, scholars focused on these firms in high-tech sectors
as incubators of economic progress (see e.g. Bartelsman et al., 2004; Calvo, 2006; Colombo
and Grilli, 2010; Cozza et al., 2012).
This firm heterogeneity also gained increasing attention under the flagship initiative ’In-
novation Union’, established in context of the ’Europe 2020’ targets (EC-DG Research and
Innovation, 2011). Next to acknowledging the potentially important role of certain types
of firms for technological change and economic growth, policy also supports the innova-
tion activities of firms in order to overcome specific constraints faced disproportionately by
these firms. The focus on specific types of firms also fits within the objective to provide ’less
and better’ state aid. Moncada et al. (2010) state that at least size, age, innovativeness and
sectoral differentiation should play an important role in the choice of policy targets. The
authors claim that the granting process of innovation subsidies should be oriented towards
small, young, high-tech innovators.
A main reason is that the smallest and youngest companies are expected to suffer more
from the well-known market failures such as a weak appropriability (Schumpeter, 1942; Nel-
son, 1959; Arrow, 1962) and uncertainty (Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) that lead to
information asymmetries between firms and external suppliers of finance and result in un-
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derinvestment in R&D (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The hypothesis that especially
small, young innovators, and more specifically independent, high-tech ones, are seriously
hampered in their innovation activities is confirmed in literature (Lerner, 1999, 2002; Evans
and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994b,a; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011; Hall and
Lerner, 2010). Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002), focusing
on independent high-tech, small and young firms conclude that these firms are most finan-
cially constrained. Westhead and Storey (1997) explicitly compare the extent to which most
technologically sophisticated small firms are more financially constrained than less techno-
logically sophisticated ones and find that the former are more impeded in growth due to
financial constraints. Goodacre and Tonks (1995) state that innovation in high-tech indus-
tries is more likely to be of a new sort because of which it is more difficult for financiers
to evaluate the investment. Storey and Tether (1998) focus specifically on NTBFs and em-
phasize their higher need of external financing2, and others discuss their high innovative
performance and growth (Storey and Tether, 1998; Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Licht and Ner-
linger, 1998; Almus and Nerlinger, 1999).
Most scholars focus on independent young firms as non-independent firms are assumed
to benefit from their parent companies or the group of firms they are associated with. That
independent firms would be more in need of external funding is already suggested multiple
times in literature. In general, Hoshi et al. (1991), Schaller (1993) and Czarnitzki and Hotten-
rott (2011) confirm that large internal capital resources reduce underinvestment problems,
suggesting that this is even more true for R&D investments. In addition, especially small
and young firms have limited access to internal funds as they cannot use earlier profit ac-
cumulations or a steady cash inflow from a broad and established product portfolio for
financing their R&D projects (see also e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen,
2002; Cassar, 2004).
The focus on these specific types of firms also gained increasing attention of several Eu-
ropean countries. In Germany, for example, the ’high-tech strategy 2020’ explicitly focuses
on key technologies as being the so-called ’drivers of innovation and the basis for new prod-
ucts, processes and services’ (BMBF (Federal Ministry of Education and Research), 2010).
In addition, as also specified by the European Commission, autonomous SME’s are distin-
guished from non-independent firms and the focus of several different policy measures is on
2NTBFs are, since the introduction of this term by the Arthur D. Little Consulting Group, an intensely
studied type of firms (Little, 1977).
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the former group (European Commission, 2008). Although the literature suggests a higher
lack of financing for these firms and governments seem to acknowledge this, there is no elab-
orated evaluation yet on whether these firms show higher treatment effects when receiving
subsidies.
In order to evaluate whether the subsidy granting process to young SMEs should be de-
termined by independence and sectoral differentiation, we compare the impact of subsidies
between four different types of young SMEs, (i) independent and high-tech (henceforth la-
beled as ’NTBFs’), (ii) non-independent, high-tech, (’group NTBFs’) (iii) independent and
low-tech, and (’LTBFs’) (iv) non-independent, low-tech (’group LTBFs’). Table 1 graphically
presents the four groups of firms analyzed in this study and recapitulates the differences
between the types of firms.
Table 1: Overview on the studied firm types as part of the population
NTBF
Independent, young SMEs
active in high-tech sectors
Group NTBF
Non-independent, young
SMEs active in high-tech
sectors Small Old firms
LTBF
Independent, young SMEs
active in low-tech sectors
Group LTBF
Non-independent, young
SMEs active in low-tech
sectors
Large young
firms
Large old firms
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We evaluate the impact of direct R&D subsidies granted to companies on several R&D in-
put measures and patents as R&D output measure. The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows: sections 2 and 3 review the evaluation literature and outline the econometric
method used for both the input and output analysis, section 4 discusses the data used and
presents descriptive statistics and section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, a conclud-
ing section summarizes the findings and discusses policy implications.
2 Subsidy input evaluation
We first evaluate the impact of direct R&D grants on innovation input. It is possible that
the subsidies are subject to crowding–out effects. This might happen if firms replace their
privately financed R&D by the public funds. Furthermore, the empirical analysis could re-
veal heterogeneity in treatment effects among different firm types. For instance, many in-
novation subsidies to young SMEs are oriented towards independent firms. If our study,
however, would show higher treatment effects for non-independent firms, i.e. those hav-
ing parent companies or being associated with groups, it would suggest a misallocation of
public resources.
In order to measure the effect of public support on R&D input, several econometric mod-
els were proposed. However, estimating the effect of public subsidies is not that straight-
forward. Firms receiving a subsidy are presumably different from companies that do not
receive a subsidy. A first difference already emerges at the application stage as some firms
might be more likely to apply for public funding than others. Some firms might consider
the administrative burden or the information sharing through the submission of research
proposals as reasons to refrain from applying for a subsidy. In addition, there is a possibil-
ity that the funding agencies follow a picking-the winner strategy with respect to the firms
that applied for a subsidy. In other words, firms might have some characteristics that make
them more attractive to governments for funding. As a consequence, funding cannot be
considered as a random process and this selection should be accounted for when evaluating
subsidy schemes. In order to evaluate the impact of subsidies on the R&D investment of
the different firm types, caliper matching is performed in this study. Thus, we do not use a
random control group, but non-subsidized firms that are similar to the subsidy recipients in
several observed characteristics.
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2.1 Literature review
The impact of R&D policies on firms’ innovation behavior has already been extensively
covered in the economic literature. The main focus in literature is on input additionality
of subsidies. As a consequence, most of the literature addressed the issue of crowding-out
effects of subsidized R&D. David et al. (2000), Cerulli (2010) and Zúñiga Vicente et al. (2014)
survey the literature on subsidy effects and find that, in general, the results of the reviewed
literature vary; possibly also due to different data sources and methods.
Among the studies reviewed in the surveys, some focus on SMEs. Wallsten (2000), for
example, uses a 3SLS approach in order to evaluate the effect of grants to SMEs in the context
of the SBIR program. At first sight, he finds crowding–out of firm–financed R&D spending
dollar for dollar. However, Wallsten (2000) remarks that this result could be simply due to
the fact that firms would have cut back their R&D expenditures in case no public funding
was available. In other words, the R&D grants may have allowed firms to continue their
R&D at a constant level rather than cutting it back.
Alecke et al. (2012) apply a matching estimator any find that SMEs, especially the micro–
sized firms, show an increase in R&D intensity as a result of subsidies. Alecke et al. (2012)
also find that subsidies increase the probability of patent applications.
While the above studies focus on SMEs, the impact of subsidies on NTBFs has not been
discussed extensively in the literature so far. Some studies evaluated the effect of subsidies
on output measures. Colombo et al. (2012) for example show that especially young NTBFs
grow more after receiving public funds and especially if these are allocated through a se-
lective evaluation process. Colombo et al. (2011) and Grilli and Murtinu (2012) focus more
specifically on R&D subsidies and find that TFP growth of NTBFs is only enhanced if subsi-
dies are provided competitively and if they aim at enhancing R&D investments.
Apart from the current study, there are, to our knowledge, no papers that study the effect
of innovation subsidies on R&D input of NTBFs. Neither exist studies that investigate the
different subsidy effects on NTBFs, Group NTBFs, LTBFs and Group LTBFs.
2.2 Methodology
In this study, we apply Caliper Matching. The technique of matching has, among others,
been discussed by Angrist (1998); Dehejia and Wahba (1999); Heckman et al. (1998); Lechner
(2000). In the context of this paper, matching tries to address the following question: “What is
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the effect of a subsidy grant on a subsidized firm?”. Thus we estimate the difference between
the actual observed R&D of the subsidized firms and the counterfactual situation, where
these firms would have not gotten subsidized. The ’average treatment effect on the treated’,
αTT, can be written as:
αTT = E
(
YT|S = 1
)
− E
(
YC|S = 1
)
, (1)
where YT denotes the treatment outcome and YC the counterfactual outcome. S takes the
value 1 if the firm is subsidized and zero otherwise. However, it is impossible to observe YC
because it is impossible to observe a treated firm without treatment. Therefore, this coun-
terfactual outcome has to be estimated and is in this context constructed based upon a con-
trol group of non-subsidized firms. The idea is to balance the sample of subsidized firms
and comparable non-subsidized firms. The remaining differences in outcomes between the
matched subsidized and non-subsidized firms can then be attributed to the received treat-
ment.
When performing matching, we replicate the conditions of an experiment to the best
possible extent. Therefore, we determine a broad set of characteristics, X, that should be
similar among firms to be matched. In other words, we compare the treated firm with an
untreated firm that is basically identical to the treated firm with respect to the characteristics
that we define. This set of characteristics should be exhaustive. Rubin (1977) introduced this
as the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which stipulates that the treatment and
the outcome of this treatment are independent for the observations having the same set of
exogenous characteristics. If this CIA is satisfied, the following equation is valid:
E
(
YC|S = 1,X
)
= E
(
YC|S = 0,X
)
(2)
Based upon this equality, the outcome of the non-subsidized firms can be used to esti-
mate the counterfactual situation of the subsidized firms and the treatment effect can then
be written as:
αTT = E
(
YT|S = 1,X=x
)
− E
(
YC|S = 0,X=x
)
(3)
Consequently, a two-sample t-test on the matched samples can be applied to test the hy-
pothesis whether αTT = 0. Usually, X contains many different variables in order to satisfy
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the CIA. This makes it almost impossible to find control variables that exactly fit the charac-
teristics of the subsidized firm. In other words, the so-called curse of dimensionality occurs
because the more dimensions that are included, the more difficult it becomes to find a good
match. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that it is possible to reduce X to a single in-
dex, the propensity score, and match on this index instead of on all the individual X. The
propensity scores are constructed based upon a probit regression of treatment, in this case
subsidies, on the exogenous variables and then used as matching argument.
We thus implement propensity score matching, and search for the nearest neighbor in
propensity scores for each treated firm in the potential control group of non-subsidized
firms. As it may happen that the nearest neighbor is still quite different from a treated firm,
we perform Caliper Matching (Cochran and Rubin, 1973). This method is similar to near-
est neighbor matching but it adds the additional restriction that the propensity score of the
nearest neighbor is within a certain, pre-specified distance. Thus, by applying this method,
it is possible that a treated observation cannot be matched to a satisfactorily similar control.
We further require that the matched control observations correspond to the same sample
year and the same geographical region (Eastern versus Western Germany) as the treated
firm observations.
As we sample with replacement in the matching routine, i.e. the same control may be
used for multiple treated firms, we follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors of the sample t-test on αTT = 0.
3 Subsidy output evaluation: the patent production function
Even if full crowding-out is rejected, it does not imply that public efforts lead to new tech-
nologies.3 Subsidized projects might be associated with a higher chance of failure and/or
lower expected revenues than projects that the firms finance themselves even in the absence
of subsidies. Therefore the subsidized projects might also have lower technological output
(David et al., 2000). In addition, the additional money might be redirected to increase wages
of existing staff, which may not be translated in an increase in output (unless staff becomes
more productive) (Goolsbee, 1998; Howells, 2008).
In order to assess the effect of both privately and publicly funded R&D on technolog-
3The focus in this study is only on technological performance of the subsidized firm themselves. This cannot
account for any effects subsidies might have on other firms via possible spill-over effects that occur between
subsidized firms and other firms in the economy.
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ical performance, we estimate their effects on patent applications. Patents are extensively
discussed and acknowledged as an indicator of technological performance (see Pakes and
Griliches, 1984; Griliches, 1990, 1998 or OECD, 1994). More specifically, they point to imme-
diate output of the R&D process, i.e. successful R&D.4
In order to estimate the patent production function, count data models are used. QMLE
(Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator) Poisson models are estimated in order to analyze
the impact of R&D on the number of patent applications. Using QML Poisson takes into ac-
count any form of over- or under-dispersion which would otherwise lead to incorrect stan-
dard errors (Wooldridge, 2002). In this setting, R&D is split into two components, purely
private R&D (the counterfactual situation) and publicly induced R&D (referring to both the
subsidies as well as possibly additionally induced private R&D because of the subsidies).
As these two variables cannot be directly observed, we construct them based upon the pre-
vious matching procedure by disentangling the R&D input into the R&D engagement of the
firm in the absence of a treatment, R&DCi , and the additionally induced R&D by the subsidy
(including the subsidy itself), αTTi . Note that the observed R&Di is thus decomposed accord-
ing to eq. 3: R&Di = R&DCi + α
TT
i . Therefore, the second equation to be estimated can be
written as
PATENTi = f
(
R&DCi ,α
TT
i ,other firm characteristics
)
(4)
If subsidies have a positive effect on technological performance, αTTi should positively
influence the patent outcome.5
Although several scholars already investigated input additionality effects, not many
studies tried to establish an explicit link between a certain (government) intervention and
patenting behavior. Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) focus on the effect of being a member
in a subsidized research consortium, and find that it has a positive effect on patenting. Czar-
nitzki et al. (2007) focus on the effect of subsidies and collaboration on patent outcome, but
as an output variable in the matching routine, thus not disentangling the counterfactual and
publicly induced R&D. In line with the current study, but focusing on all types of firms in
4In spite of being a direct indicator of technological progress, patents are a narrow measure of innovation
output. Other variables, like successful innovations in terms of sales with new products or cost reductions,
could serve as further indicators of innovation outcome. Also employment growth as the ultimate goal of
many policy initiatives would be a very interesting extension of our study. We choose patents, as they should
be the closest outcome of the corresponding research projects with respect to timing.
5Note that contemporaneous R&D is inserted in this equation as this has been found to have the strongest
effect on patenting (Hall et al., 1986; Pakes and Griliches, 1984).
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the economy, Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) and Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) implement
a matching estimator in order to estimate innovation input additionality and then estimate
output additionality in a second step as outlined here.
4 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data sources
The data used in this paper stem from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), the German
part of the Community Innovation Survey. Next to information on general firm-level charac-
teristics, this database contains specific information on innovation activities and the receipt
of subsidies. Our data are pooled cross–sections of the years (these years of the MIP data
include information on subsidies): 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006. Patent
data are taken from the German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO). Our version of the
database contains information on all patent applications in Germany from 1979 to 2005.
Patent and firm data were linked using a computer-supported text search algorithm and
potential matches were checked manually. Furthermore, some variables have been gathered
from the ’Creditreform’ database. Creditreform is the largest German credit rating agency
and the database includes information on firms’ ratings and other variables.
Unfortunately, we can use the data only as pooled cross-sections but not as a panel: of
the total sample of 3,272 observations, corresponding to 2,399 different firms, about 72% of
the firms are only observed once. As a consequence, panel econometric approaches are not
applicable as we would need to drop the 72% of the sampled firms that are only observed
once.
Our sample includes NTBFs, Group NTBFs, LTBFs and Group LTBFs. All these firm
classes have less than 250 employees and are less than 10 years old.6 NTBFs and Group
NTBFs belong to the high-tech or key-tech technologies as defined in the high-tech strategy
6In general, literature is ambiguous in defining NTBFs and small, young firms in general. With respect to
size, the threshold of 250 employees is the official threshold of SME’s, while small firms in the strict sense are
officially defined (as e.g. by the European Commission) as having less than 50 employees. In literature, either
one of the thresholds is used to define small firms (Schneider and Veugelers, 2010; Acs and Audretsch, 1989).
With respect to age, literature is even more ambiguous when it comes to determining ’young’ age. (Colombo
et al., 2012, 2011; Grilli and Murtinu, 2012). In order to test whether our results are robust to alternative criteria,
we also conducted the matching estimation for firms having less than 50 employees and being less than 5 years
old. The differences found between the different firm categories are robust. However, with the more restrictive
definition we run into small sample size problems for the second step of the analysis, the estimation of output
effects.
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(BMBF (Federal Ministry of Education and Research), 2010), while LTBFs and Group LTBFs
belong to medium low-tech and low-tech sectors (for an overview of the industry classifica-
tion, see table A1 in appendix).7 In addition, all the firms in the sample are innovative and
have thus introduced at least one new or significantly improved product or process, or have
ongoing or abandoned innovation projects during the period covered in the survey.
Table 2 presents the sizes of the different samples before and after matching. As can be
derived from the table, the sample initially consists of 1228 NTBFs, 609 Group NTBFs, 965
LTBFs and 470 Group LTBFs in total. Among those, the non-subsidized firms can poten-
tially serve as controls for matching. Table 2 shows that, in line with expectations, a larger
share of NTBFs receive subsidies than LTBFs. The table also shows how many of the treated
observations could be matched to nearest neighbors that were similar enough in observed
characteristics. For instance, out of 649 subsidized NTBFs, a close neighbor could be found
for 599.
4.2 Variables
4.2.1 Dependent variables
This study investigates the influence of subsidies on various outcome variables. The receipt
of subsidies is denoted by a dummy variable SUB, and covers subsidies from the national
or regional governments and from the EU. In order to evaluate the effect of subsidies on
the innovative behavior of firms, we investigate the impact on R&D intensity of these firms,
RDint. This variable is constructed as the ratio of internal R&D expenditures to turnover
(multiplied by 100). We also evaluate the subsidy effect on the level of R&D expenditures
(R&D).
A large part of R&D spending consists of salaries of R&D employees. If companies in-
crease their R&D expenditures after receiving R&D subsidies, a large fraction of this in-
creased spending might be due to hiring new R&D employees. However, as Goolsbee (1998)
states, R&D labor supply might be quite inelastic and the increased spending might instead
be redirected to higher wages for existing staff instead of resulting in new human capital
which is not the direct aim of government subsidies. If it would be the case that R&D sub-
7Note that this distinction between high-tech and low-tech industries also coincides with distinguishing
between the most and least R&D intensive sectors in the German economy based upon the survey data.
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Table 2: Numbers of observations in the different subsamples
NTBF
subsidized 649
potential controls 579
Matched subsidized firms: 599
Group NTBF
subsidized 306
potential controls 303
Matched subsidized firms: 262
Old firms (< 250
employees, ≥ 10
years old)
6432 obs
LTBF
subsidized 328
potential controls 637
Matched subsidized firms: 284
Group LTBF
subsidized 120
potential controls 350
Matched subsidized firms: 95
Large firms (≥
250 employees,
< 10 years old)
695 obs
Large and Old
firms (≥ 250
employees, ≥ 10
years old)
2936 obs
sidies lead to higher wages, a positive treatment effect found for R&D spending might thus
not mean that more knowledge is created in the economy. Only if either new R&D staff is
hired or higher wages lead to higher R&D productivity, the policy would have its desired
effects. Therefore, we first test whether not only R&D spending is related positively to the
subsidy receipt but also R&D employment. We use two variables, the number of R&D em-
ployees (RDemp) and the R&D employment intensity (RDEint) measured as the number of
R&D employees over the total number of employees (multiplied by 100).
In order to investigate the effect of subsidies on output, we disentangle RDEint into the
counterfactual situation RDEintCi and the additionally induced R&D employment intensity,
αTT,i for all four firm groups. The dependent variable in this stage is the number of patent
applications (PAT). Note that this output stage also takes into account R&D productivity
boosts because of potentially increased wages of R&D personnel.
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4.2.2 Explanatory variables
Although we focus on SMEs, there might still be differences between the larger and smaller
firms within this subset. Therefore, we control for firm size by the log of total employment,
ln(EMP), and also its square, (ln(EMP))2, in order to capture possible nonlinearities. Simi-
larly, although we are already focusing on the youngest firms in the economy, we include the
logarithm of age (ln(AGE)) in the analysis in order to capture differences between younger
and older firms.
Firms that export to other countries might be more innovative than other companies.
The chance that they apply for innovation subsidies is thus also higher. As a consequence,
a dummy indicating whether a firm is an exporter or not, EXPORTER, is included in the
analysis. Another variable that may be correlated with subsidy receipt is capital intensity
(CAPINT), measured as (fixed assets/EMP). Capital intensive firms supposedly rely more
heavily on innovation activities than the less capital intensive ones.
Another variable that is included is the price-cost margin (PCM). Firms with a higher
price-cost margin are more likely to have financial resources for internal funding of R&D
projects. As a consequence, they might apply less for subsidies. However, a high price-cost
margin might be the result of successful past innovation activities and the likelihood to
receive subsidies might thus increase. The price-cost margin is constructed as suggested by
Collins and Preston (1969) and Ravenscraft (1983): ((sales - staff cost - material costs)/sales).
The history of (successful) R&D activities is likely to strongly influence both the probabil-
ity to receive subsidies, R&D expenditures and R&D employment. If a firm already has a lot
of experience in R&D activities, this firm is more likely to know how to apply for subsidies
and to invest more in new R&D activities. In addition, governments often adopt a picking-
the-winner strategy and firms with previous successful innovations might thus be favored
in the granting process. In order to capture the influence of past R&D, we include the patent
stock in our regression as patent stock per employee (PS/EMP). We divide by employees in
order to reduce potential multicollinearity with firm size. Patent stock is defined as
PSit = (1− δ)PSi,t−1 + PAit,
where PS is the patent stock of firm i in period t and t-1 respectively, PA is the number
of patent applications filed in period t. The patent stock in period t-1 is depreciated at a
12
constant rate, with δ set to 0.15 (see e.g. Jaffe, 1986; Hall, 1990; Griliches and Mairesse, 1984).
As already elaborated, credit constraints might also have an influence on subsidy receipt
and the outcome variables. In order to capture the access a firm has to external capital, we
use the firm’s credit rating, RATING, lagged one period. The rating is an index ranging from
100 to 600, where 600 is the worst and essentially corresponds to bankruptcy of the firm.
The dummy variable EAST indicates firms that are located in Eastern Germany. Eastern
Germany is still in transition from a planned to a market economy, and firm behavior may
thus be different. In addition, Eastern German firms are preferred in the policy incentive
schemes, and special schemes have been launched exclusively for these firms in order to
accelerate the catching up process in this region.
In addition, we control for differences in technological opportunities with industry dum-
mies (see Table A1 in the appendix for details). These industry dummies are based on
the NACE codes, the European industry standard classification system. Finally, seven time
dummies control for business cycle effects.
For the variables PCM, CAPINT and RATING, we have some missing values. In order to
account for these missing values, we construct dummy variables equal to 1 if the values are
missing (D(PCM), D(CAPINT) and D(RATING)). In addition, we set the missing values in
the original variables to zero. Including both the dummy variable and the adjusted original
variables in the analysis corrects for missing values and avoids the imputation of unknown
values.
Also note that all time-varying variables (except AGE) enter the regression as lagged
values to avoid simultaneity bias.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the four different firm
types. The t-tests reveal that there are some significant differences between subsidized firms
and the potential control groups. The subsidized firms are, on average, more export-oriented,
are more often situated in Eastern Germany and have more patents per employee. Some av-
erage differences are only significant for specific firm types. For example, only the indepen-
dent subsidized firms have, on average, significant more employees than the non-subsidized
independent firms. Similarly, only the class of high-tech subsidized firms has, on average, a
significant lower price cost margin than the non-subsidized class and only the independent
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high-tech firms have a lower credit rating (thus higher values of the RATING variable) for
subsidized firms than for the potential control group.
Table 3: Descriptive statisticsa
NTBFs Group NTBFs
subsidized firms potential control group p-value of two- subsidized firms potential control group p-value of two-
N1=649 N1=579 sided t-test on N1=306 N1=303 sided t-test on
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. mean equality Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. mean equality
EMP 42.515 52.871 36.546 48.737 p=0.041 80.330 72.048 90.185 159.540 p=0.326
AGE 6.131 2.034 6.195 2.112 p=0.588 6.075 2.086 6.092 2.129 p=0.920
EXPORTER 0.629 0.484 0.390 0.488 p < 0.0001 0.752 0.433 0.581 0.494 p < 0.0001
CAPINT∗ 0.064 0.110 0.129 1.261 p=0.290 0.238 1.644 0.064 0.103 p=0.174
PCM∗ 0.032 0.950 0.226 0.622 p=0.001 0.044 0.673 0.186 0.778 p=0.042
EAST 0.678 0.468 0.427 0.495 p < 0.0001 0.663 0.473 0.294 0.456 p < 0.0001
PS/EMP 0.040 0.078 0.013 0.045 p < 0.0001 0.038 0.069 0.019 0.052 p < 0.0001
RATING∗ 251.777 55.770 243.727 49.940 p=0.011 238.257 39.115 235.948 37.201 p=0.489
D(CAPINT) 0.337 0.473 0.509 0.500 p=0.000 0.255 0.437 0.452 0.499 p=0.000
D(PCM) 0.250 0.433 0.444 0.497 p=0.000 0.209 0.407 0.376 0.485 p=0.000
D(RATING) 0.074 0.262 0.090 0.286 p=0.311 0.098 0.298 0.175 0.381 p=0.006
Pˆ(X) 0.635 0.209 0.408 0.203 p < 0.0001 0.628 0.222 0.376 0.211 p < 0.0001
RDint 19.573 29.217 3.568 11.419 p < 0.0001 16.808 28.774 4.510 15.550 p < 0.0001
RDEint 32.568 29.865 9.639 18.113 p < 0.0001 25.734 27.599 9.082 18.382 p < 0.0001
R&D 1.013 4.945 0.147 0.579 p < 0.0001 1.804 4.770 0.868 2.515 p=0.003
R&Demp 8.957 14.786 1.875 3.913 p < 0.0001 15.779 25.637 6.344 17.444 p < 0.0001
PATb 0.444 1.253 0.128 1.224 p < 0.0001 0.682 1.805 0.244 1.191 p < 0.0001
Low-Tech NTBFs Low-Tech Group NTBFs
subsidized firms potential control group p-value of two- subsidized firms potential control group p-value of two-
N1=328 N1=637 sided t-test on N1=120 N1=350 sided t-test on
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. mean equality Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. mean equality
EMP 57.845 55.165 43.848 46.898 p < 0.0001 87.533 62.246 78.140 68.088 p=0.183
AGE 6.290 2.133 6.055 2.118 p=0.104 6.400 2.056 6.040 2.162 p=0.112
EXPORTER 0.506 0.501 0.273 0.446 p < 0.0001 0.567 0.498 0.423 0.495 p=0.006
CAPINT∗ 0.104 0.165 0.106 0.176 p=0.914 0.131 0.402 0.299 0.926 p=0.100
PCM∗ 0.138 0.696 0.210 0.686 p=0.200 0.147 0.676 0.207 0.858 p=0.549
EAST 0.872 0.335 0.641 0.480 p < 0.0001 0.742 0.440 0.414 0.493 p < 0.0001
PS/EMP 0.015 0.054 0.004 0.025 p < 0.0001 0.016 0.051 0.003 0.017 p < 0.0001
RATING∗ 244.379 38.679 245.960 54.059 p=0.653 232.290 29.518 236.263 55.912 p=0.484
D(CAPINT) 0.293 0.456 0.540 0.499 p=0.000 0.242 0.430 0.491 0.501 p=0.000
D(PCM) 0.195 0.397 0.462 0.499 p=0.000 0.217 0.414 0.446 0.498 p=0.000
D(RATING) 0.082 0.275 0.104 0.305 p=0.289 0.108 0.312 0.157 0.364 p=0.190
Pˆ(X) 0.506 0.224 0.256 0.188 p < 0.0001 0.426 0.224 0.200 0.161 p < 0.0001
RDint 4.620 11.313 0.668 1.625 p < 0.0001 3.492 6.903 1.178 5.226 p < 0.0001
RDEint 11.232 17.374 3.693 10.809 p < 0.0001 6.894 12.046 3.439 9.309 p=0.001
R&D 0.195 0.348 0.074 0.634 p=0.001 0.471 1.028 0.224 1.144 p=0.036
R&Demp 3.768 5.796 1.001 2.513 p < 0.0001 3.938 5.851 1.797 6.135 p=0.001
PATb 0.121 0.528 0.029 0.227 p < 0.0001 0.581 2.372 0.120 1.120 p=0.006
a : Industry dummies and time dummies not reported
b : Patent descriptives only shown for observations for which this variable is available
∗ : For the variables Capint, PCM and Credit rating, the descriptive statistics are based on the actual observed observations. The observations for which the dummy
was set to 1 and the missings to zero are thus not included.
With respect to the outcome variables, the NTBFs and Group NTBFs show the highest
values in general. In addition, all outcome variables differ significantly between subsidized
firms and their respective control groups. In all cases, the subsidized firms have higher inten-
sities and more R&D expenditures and employees. The question whether these differences
can be attributed to the subsidies will be empirically investigated subsequently.
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5 Estimation and results
5.1 Subsidy effect on small young firms
In order to apply the matching estimator, we first estimate a probit model on the receipt of
subsidies for obtaining propensity scores. Table 4 presents the results of this estimation in
columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this table for the different firm categories. The first column estimates
the likelihood of receiving subsidies for the full sample, introducing the different firm class
dummies, with NTBF as reference category, in the estimation. This reveals that NTBFs are
more likely to receive subsidies than all other firm categories defined. In addition, when
testing the equality of the coefficients of the other firm categories, we find that high-tech
firms in general are more likely to receive subsidies. Within each broader group of high-tech
and low-tech firms, the independent ones also seem to be more likely to receive subsidies.
In addition, we find that companies located in Eastern Germany have a higher prob-
ability to receive subsidies. In addition, the results also confirm the higher probability of
receiving subsidies if the patent stock is larger. Except for Group LTBFs, being an exporter
has a positive effect on subsidy receipt.
Having obtained a propensity score based on the estimation results of the probit estima-
tion on subsidy receipt, we restrict the sample to common support. The matching estimator
is not appropriate for regions of the distribution where the propensity scores of the samples
of treated and controls do not overlap. Table 5 shows how many observations have to be
dropped for each firm class in order to assure a sufficient overlap between the treated and
untreated firms under consideration. Next to the restriction of common support, we also
impose a similarity threshold as we apply caliper matching. This caliper threshold defines
the tolerated maximum distance between treated and untreated firms. We chose a threshold
of 0.05. The third column of table 5 presents the number of observations that are lost after
setting this threshold. The last column of that table shows how many treated observations
can be successfully matched.
After setting the different thresholds, we pick the nearest neighbor from the control
group. After matching, there are no statistically significant differences in the exogenous
variables anymore. In line with this, the propensity score is also not significantly different
between the two groups (results not shown here). Table 6 shows the outcome of the tests on
overall model significance of the probit models on subsidy receipt after matching as a test on
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Table 4: Probit estimation on subsidy (SUB)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
full sample NTBF Group NTBF LTBF Group LTBF
ln(AGE) -0.077 -0.104 -0.264* -0.135 0.215
(0.064) (0.102) (0.136) (0.118) (0.184)
EXPORTER 0.408*** 0.543*** 0.420*** 0.397*** -0.028
(0.059) (0.090) (0.139) (0.107) (0.168)
ln(EMP) 0.045 0.041 -0.059 0.026 0.329
(0.116) (0.164) (0.249) (0.231) (0.361)
ln(EMP)2 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.016 -0.036
(0.017) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.050)
D(CAPINT) -0.273*** -0.163 -0.226 -0.303* -0.416
(0.092) (0.139) (0.218) (0.181) (0.285)
CAPINT -0.008 -0.126 0.836 0.400 -0.179
(0.036) (0.343) (0.750) (0.353) (0.174)
PCM -0.091 -0.134* -0.138 0.005 -0.074
(0.056) (0.074) (0.088) (0.085) (0.107)
D(PCM) -0.186** -0.223 -0.122 -0.375** 0.124
(0.093) (0.140) (0.204) (0.190) (0.280)
EAST 0.958*** 0.989*** 1.094*** 1.053*** 0.966***
(0.065) (0.091) (0.120) (0.127) (0.164)
PS/EMP 3.831*** 3.310*** 3.301*** 5.365*** 8.982***
(0.587) (0.692) (1.020) (1.349) (2.744)
RATING -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
D(RATING) -0.205 0.184 -0.623 -0.436 -0.555
(0.169) (0.244) (0.446) (0.316) (0.539)
GroupNTBF -0.177**
(0.080)
LTBF -0.457***
(0.166)
GroupLTBF -0.641***
(0.170)
Constant -0.286 -0.119 -0.122 -0.534 -3.075**
(0.303) (0.402) (0.716) (0.677) (1.201)
Test on joint significance of
-industry dummies χ2(11) = 37.71*** χ2(4) = 6.63 χ2(4) = 7.34 χ2(8)= 25.26*** χ2(8)= 11.38
-time dummies χ2(7) = 46.08*** χ2(7) = 48.92*** χ2(7) = 4.35 χ2(7) = 23.60*** χ2(7) = 9.02
test: GNTBF = LTBF = GLTBF χ2(2) = 9.45***
test: GNTBF = LTBF χ2(1) = 2.73*
test: GNTBF = GLTBF χ2(1) = 7.38***
test: LTBF = GLTBF χ2(1) = 4.36**
N 3272 1228 609 965 470
Log-Likelihood -1786.094 -694.532 -336.673 -490.595 -212.636
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Loss of subsidized observations due to a lack of common support and due to caliper
threshold
sample Initial sample
size of subsidized
firms
lack of common
support
out of caliper
threshold 0.05
final sample size
of subsidized
firms
NTBF 649 -4 -46 599
Group NTBF 306 -4 -40 262
LTBF 328 -8 -36 284
Group LTBF 120 -8 -17 95
the quality of the matching routine. As can be seen in the table, the null hypothesis that all
coefficients in the regressions are jointly zero is not rejected for any type of firm, as expected
in case of successful matching.
Table 6: Significance of probit regressions after matching
sample # obs Waldχ2(23) p-value
NTBFs 1198 5.17 1.0000
Group NTBFs 524 8.76 0.9967
Low-tech NTBFs 568 16.87a 0.9342
Group low-tech NTBFs 190 15.99a 0.9531
a: Due to different industry classification of low-tech NTBFs: Waldχ2(27)
Table 7 presents the matching results concerning the outcome variables. Almost all treat-
ment effects are positive and significant, which can, after matching, be attributed to the re-
ceipt of subsidies. As a consequence, full crowding-out effects are rejected for all firm types.
However, the table also suggests that the treatment effects may differ across the different
firm categories. In order to analyze the heterogeneity in treatment effects in more detail, we
apply an auxiliary regression analysis in the following subsection.
5.2 Further evaluation of the treatment effects
In order to investigate possible heterogeneity across firm types in more detail, we obtain
αTT,i for each treated firm from the matching routine. As we are interested in testing whether
the effects differ across firm types, we run the following supplemental regression after the
matching where we pool the four samples of different firm types.
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Table 7: Treatment effects after matching
NTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 599
R&Dint 14.103***
R&DEint 20.555***
R&D 0.702***
R&D emp 5.241***
Group NTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 262
R&Dint 8.292**
R&DEint 11.840***
R&D 0.344
R&D emp 7.167***
Small Old firms
LTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 284
R&Dint 3.132***
R&DEint 3.901**
R&D 0.094***
R&D emp 1.630***
Group LTBF
Matched subsidized firms: 95
R&Dint 1.628*
R&DEint 3.934***
R&D 0.205**
R&D emp 1.897**
Large young
firms
Large old firms
αTT,i = β0 + β1GroupNTBFi + β2LTBFi + β3GroupLTBFi + ei (5)
The constant term β0 then reflects the treatment effect for NTBFs and the other coeffi-
cients show the difference in treatment effects relative to NTBFs. In order to evaluate the
differences of the treatment effects with respect to other firm types, we perform F-tests on
the equality of their coefficients.
While simply regressing the treatment effect on the different firm type dummies indicates
to what extent the differences in treatment effects are significant, this does not account for
other factors that might influence these differences. In order to control for other effects, we
include extra control variables, Xi, in the regressions on the treatment effects.
αTT,i = β0 + β1GroupNTBFi + β2LTBFi + β3GroupLTBFi + βXXi + ei (6)
As already shown above, young high-tech SMEs seem to be more likely to receive sub-
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sidies. If these firms thus get funding from multiple sources, it might actually explain why
they seem to have higher treatment effects than low-tech firms. All firms included in the es-
timation of the treatment effect are subsidized firms, having received funding from at least
one source. However, it is possible that some firms included in the sample received subsidies
from both the European Union, the federal government and local governments. Similarly,
some firms might have been subsidized by two different funding sources. Czarnitzki and
Lopes Bento (2014) differentiate between firms having received national funding, European
funding and funding at both the national and the European level and find that, in terms of
input, getting funding from both sources yields the highest impact. As a consequence, we
control for these multiple sources of subsidies. We do so by including two dummies 2SUB
and 3SUB, referring to firms that received subsidies from 2 funding sources and all 3 fund-
ing sources respectively; firms that received funding from only one source are the reference
category.
Another factor, very specific to the German case is the difference between Eastern and
Western Germany. Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) found that input additionality has been more
pronounced in Eastern Germany during the transition period than in Western Germany.
In addition, Eastern German firms were preferred in several subsidy schemes in order to
accelerate the transition process after the German re-unification in 1991. It is thus possible
that the differences in treatment effects between different firm types can be attributed to the
fact that the firm type with higher treatment effects is mainly present in Eastern Germany.
In order to control for potential different location effects, we include a dummy EAST in the
regressions.
Although we already focus on SMEs, we still control for heterogeneity in total employ-
ment. Next to controlling for size, we also control for age by including age in the estimation.
Finally, we include time dummies in the estimation in order to control for business cycle
effects. The patent stock per employee controls for heterogeneity in past R&D success.8
8Information on the different subsidy sources is not available for all years in the analysis. As a consequence,
we had to drop one year (1996) because of missing information on the subsidy sources.
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Table 8 presents the results of the treatment effect regressions for the different dependent
variables: R&D intensity, R&D employment intensity, R&D expenditures and R&D employ-
ment. For each treatment effect, both the basic regression without additional control vari-
ables and the extended regression are presented. Note that all standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. The table reveals that the differences between high-tech and low-tech young
SMEs in table 8 are only confirmed for independent firms. NTBFs always have a higher input
additionality than both LTBFs and Group LTBFs, even after including the control variables
in the regressions. For Group NTBFs, we initially also find significant differences compared
to LTBFs and Group LTBFs for almost all treatment effects, as can be seen in the tests on
differences between coefficients at the bottom of table 8. However, after including the addi-
tional control variables in the regression framework, these results change. First, the signifi-
cant higher increase in R&D intensity that was found for Group NTBFs compared to LTBFs
and Group LTBFs after receiving subsidies becomes insignificant. Similarly, the higher treat-
ment effect for RDEint when comparing Group NTBFs and Group LTBFs becomes insignifi-
cant. Only the subsidy-induced increase in R&D employment remains (weakly) significantly
higher when comparing Group NTBFs to all low-tech firm categories.
When focusing solely on low-tech firms, we find at most a very weak significant differ-
ence between effects of subsidies on independent and group firms (see tests on differences
between coefficients at the bottom of table 8). As a consequence, for low-tech firms, a pol-
icy focus on independent young SMEs does not seem to be warranted. For young high-tech
SMEs, however, the differentiation between independent firms and group firms seems to
matter, although not for all treatment effects. In the basic regressions, the differences are only
significant for the treatment effects on the intensity measures (see coefficient of Group NTBF,
indicating the relative difference in treatment effects to the reference category of NTBFs, in
columns 1 and 3 of Table 8). In the extended regressions, the difference between the R&D
expenditures’ treatment effect also become significant (see column 6 of table 8). The results
also reveal that the lower treatment effect that was found on R&D employment for NTBFs
as compared to Group NTBFs is insignificant in the basic regression (see column 7). This
suggests that Group NTBFs do not make more efficient use of R&D subsidies in terms of
R&D employment, as was initially indicated by the treatment effects. 9
9It has to be noted that the differences between group and independent firms have to be interpreted with
caution, as we can only assess the effect of subsidies on the firm surveyed, independent of its other group
members. It might well be the case that the effect of subsidies reaches beyond the single group member sur-
veyed and also has an effect on R&D input of other group members. However, spillover effects are difficult to
tackle in input additionality studies and they might as well flow from independent firms to others. It is very
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In general, the above findings suggest that high-tech firms and especially the indepen-
dent ones within this category have higher treatment effects. These findings are re-assuring,
as policy makers often target small, young independent firms when launching new policy
instruments. Here it is also revealed that it might be relevant to base this decision in a first
stage on sector of activity. Only when the focus shifts to high-tech firms, results suggest that
NTBFs make more effective use of subsidies than Group NTBFs. However, this latter re-
sult should be interpreted with caution as spill-overs to other group members could not be
taken into account. In addition, table 7 revealed that full crowding out could be rejected for
all firm types studied. As a consequence, although results suggest that high-tech firms in-
crease their R&D inputs more after receiving subsidies, none of these groups seem to merely
replace their private R&D inputs by public money or seem to simply give higher wages to
existing staff without increasing current R&D employment.
5.3 The effect on technological progress
We now turn to the second major research question in this paper, that is, if additionally
induced R&D input leads to technological progress. As already explained above, an increase
in R&D inputs does not necessarily lead to technological progress of the firm. We measure
technological progress or performance as the patent activity at the firm level, i.e. the number
of patent applications per year (PAT). In this setting, we use R&D employment intensity as
an input factor for the patent production function.
The R&D employment intensity input factors are based upon the estimated treatment
and counterfactual from the matching procedure. RDEintCi represents the part of the total
R&D employment intensity that the firms would have had in absence of subsidies. This
component of R&D employment intensity is just equal to the total R&D employment inten-
sity for the non-subsidized firms. In addition, the treatment effect on the treated αTTi is the
additionally induced R&D employment intensity, as was already introduced in section 5.2.
For the non-subsidized firms this variable takes the value zero by construction. In addition
to these two R&D-related variables, we control for industry differences in patenting behav-
ior, and also include time dummies. In addition, we include the log of lagged employment,
log(EMP), and log of age, log(AGE), to take possible size and age effects into account. The
dummy variable EAST is also inserted in this framework in order to take into account that
difficult to evaluate this in our context, however, as we do not have complete information on all other group
affiliates.
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patenting activity in the still developing Eastern German region might be lower.
In addition to a pooled cross-sectional QMLE Poisson model, we also estimate the so-
called pre-sample mean QMLE poisson model (henceforth PSM) (Blundell et al., 1995, 2002).
Unlike in the R&D input equation where we cannot control for firm-specific effects due to
the cross-sectional nature of our database, we can do so when patents are considered, as we
were able to collect information on firms’ pre-sample patenting activity. One can control for
unobserved time-invariant firm-heterogeneity if pre-sample information on the dependent
variable is available. Blundell et al. (1995, 2002) showed that the unobserved heterogeneity
can be approximated by implementing the pre-sample mean of the dependent variable as
an additional regressor. This basically amounts to controlling for ’quasi fixed effects’. The
pre-sample mean patenting is denoted by PSM.
Table 9 shows the results of this estimation. Note that we lose some observations due to
the fact that we only have access to the patent data until 2005. Columns 1-2 show results
when not differentiating between different firm categories and columns 3-4 show results
when measures of the counterfactual and treatment are inserted separately for the different
firm categories. We present bootstrapped standard errors as the R&D measures of the treated
firms are estimated. We used 200 replications of the whole matching procedure and the
subsequent estimation of the patent production function to estimate the bootstrap standard
errors.
When first focusing on the broad results in columns 1-2, a similar picture as in previous
studies emerges (Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004). The estimated coefficients of the coun-
terfactual R&D and the subsidy-induced R&D are both significantly positive, both for the
QMLE poisson and PSM QMLE Poisson estimation. In addition, our results indicate that the
coefficient of the counterfactual R&D is slightly larger than the one of subsidy-induced R&D,
although this result is only weakly significant under the PSM QMLE poisson estimation as
shown by the χ2’s from a likelihood ratio (LR) test.
In columns 3-4, we make a distinction between the four different firm categories by in-
troducing counterfactual R&D and the subsidy-induced R&D for all firms separately. All
estimated coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero except the one of the
subsidy-induced R&D of Group LTBFs.
Tests show that the hypothesis of equal coefficients of counterfactual and treatment can
in general not be rejected within the different firm groups, except for NTBFs. This difference
becomes however only weakly significant in the PSM QMLE poisson estimation.
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The more interesting comparison in the context of our study is, however, the different
among the coefficients of the subsidy-induced R&D across the four categories of firm types.
There we find that the marginal effect of subsidy-induced R&D is highest for LTBFs. This,
however, does not imply that subsidizing R&D in this type of firms promises the highest
absolute output effects. It has to be taken into account that LTBFs have a lower level of R&D
than e.g. NTBFs and that the estimated input additionality is higher for NTBFs.
In order to get an impression on absolute rather than marginal effects, it is instructive to
calculate patent-R&D elasticities, for instance. The Poisson model has the form y = exp(x′b).
Thus, the elasticity can e.g. be calculated at the mean as
ε(̂¯y, RD) = bˆRD exp(x¯′bˆ) RD
exp(x¯′bˆ)
= bˆRDRD (7)
In our context, we e.g. obtain for the case that an NTBF would not have been subsidized:
Counterfactual output for NTBF: 0.027× 12.013 = 0.324410
Because of the subsidy, however, we should add the coefficient of the treatment effect times
additionally induced R&D to the calculation:
0.027× 12.013 + 0.02× 20.555 = 0.7355.
The subsidy-induced absolute effect in terms of elasticity is thus an increment of 0.411.
The corresponding effect for LTBFs is, however, only
0.04× (11.232− 3.901) + 0.031× 3.901 = 0.4142,
or in other words the increment due to subsidies is only 0.121 here (0.031× 3.901).
Consequently the absolute output gain is larger when subsidizing NTBFs rather than LTBFs
despite the larger marginal effect of the additionally induced R&D for LTBFs.11
6 Conclusion
Governments acknowledge the fact that especially smaller and younger firms are in need
of R&D subsidies. In light of the ’Europe 2020’ strategy, they increasingly focus on ’less
and better’ state aid, thereby trying to target firms that will most effectively make use of
their grants. Frequently, firms in high-tech sectors are preferred in public schemes. Further-
more, the European Commission since recently also emphasizes that especially small- and
1012.013 is the result of taking average R&D of subsidized NTBFs, 32.568 (see table 3, descriptive statistics),
minus the estimated treatment effect 20.555 (see Table 7).
11As already noted multiple times throughout this paper, we abstain from drawing any conclusions on the
potential spill-over effects generated by subsidized firms.
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Table 9: Estimation of the patent equation for all firm groups (N=2292)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
αTTi 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.004)
RDEintCi 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.005)
αTTi NTBF 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.005)
αTTi Group_NTBF 0.017** 0.018**
(0.008) (0.008)
αTTi LTBF 0.031** 0.032**
(0.012) (0.013)
αTTi Group_LTBF 0.022 0.022
(0.082) (0.082)
RDEintCi NTBF 0.027*** 0.026**
(0.011) (0.011)
RDEintCi Group_NTBF 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
RDEintCi LTBF 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.005) (0.005)
RDEintCi Group_LTBF 0.046 0.044
(5.450) (5.192)
EAST -0.491* -0.521* -0.480* -0.503*
(0.288) (0.223) (0.289) (0.278)
ln(EMP) 0.676*** 0.649*** 0.749*** 0.715***
(0.099) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102)
ln(AGE) 0.154 0.086 0.155 0.090
(0.271) (0.273) (0.265) (0.268)
PRESAM 0.197 0.185
(0.203) (0.203)
Constant -4.246*** -3.986*** -4.331*** -4.051***
(0.921) (0.907) (0.915) (0.895)
χ2 test on joint significance of time dummies 42.42*** 63.13*** 50.01*** 68.92***
χ2 test on joint significance of industry dummies 176.87*** 150.84*** 186.44*** 163.35***
χ2 LR test: αTTi = RDEint
C
i 4.70** 3.56*
χ2 LR test: RDEintCi NTBF = α
TT
i NTBF 4.76** 2.86*
χ2 LR test: RDEintCi Group_NTBF = α
TT
i Group_NTBF 1.90 2.07
χ2 LR test: RDEintCi LTBF = α
TT
i LTBF 1.60 1.24
χ2 LR test: RDEintCi Group_LTBF = α
TT
i Group_LTBF 0.27 0.24
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medium-sized, young, stand-alone high-tech firms make possibly the most effective use
of public funds. Thus, firms associated with groups of firms have less access to subsidies
than in the past. While these policies thus give a clear preference to a certain type of firms,
it is surprising that so far no systematic impact evaluation of such policies exists. Conse-
quently, in this study, we compare the effect of innovation subsidies on New Technology
Based Firms (NTBF), Low Technology Based Firms (LTBFs) and their group counterparts
for a sample of German firms. NTBFs are young independent high-tech SMEs, while LTBFs
are the corresponding firms in low-tech sectors. We denote their non-independent counter-
parts by ’Group NTBFs’ and ’Group LTBFs’.
In a first stage, we estimate the input additionality effects for each of these firm types, i.e.
we analyze the policy impact on firms’ R&D intensity, R&D expenditures, R&D employment
intensity and R&D employment numbers. Considering these firm types separately in our
empirical analysis also enables us to compare the estimated treatment effects among these
groups. In a second stage, we turn to the effect subsidies have on innovation output as
measured by patents.
In order to evaluate the impact of innovation subsidies on the innovation input of NTBFs,
Group NTBFs, LTBFs and Group LTBFs, caliper matching with replacement is applied in
order to correct for a potential selection bias. In general, our results reveal that full crowding-
out with regard to public funding can be rejected for all firm types studied.
In order to assess the potential differences in subsidy effects, we compare the treatment
effects of the different firm types by regressing the individual treatment effects on the differ-
ent firm types and additional control variables. Our results reveal that the treatment effects
on independent NTBFs are actually highest, as presumed by policy makers. Thus our em-
pirical study does not only support the currently common choice to give a preferential treat-
ment to small, young and independent firms active in high-tech sectors, but also provides
evidence that previous estimations of innovation policy impacts might have been partly mis-
leading as usually no distinction between preferential firm profiles in policy schemes have
been made.
In a second step, we carry the results of the treatment effects analysis over to the esti-
mation of a patent production function, where R&D employment intensity is disentangled
into two components: on the one hand, the purely privately R&D employment intensity in
the absence of subsidies and, on the other hand, the additionally induced R&D employment
intensity that is stimulated by the subsidy. Results of this estimation reveal that due to in-
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creased R&D input that was found in a first step, also higher R&D output is achieved by the
subsidized firms.
Of course, our study has a number of limitations that remain for further research. First,
we only consider Germany as an example of a European economy. It is questionable whether
our results hold for other countries within the European community. In addition, the anal-
ysis on input additionality would benefit from the availability of panel data to control for
firm fixed effects. Longer time series of data would allow investigating the effect of R&D
subsidies on a wider range of R&D output indicators. Next to these limitations related to
the time-structure of the data, we could only assess whether a firm has received a subsidy
or not, without being able to assess potential heterogeneities in the grants. Although we al-
ready introduced information on different subsidy sources, we do not know how much aid
is actually given to a firm. Introducing this latter aspect in the estimations would be very
interesting for further research.
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Appendix
Table A1: Industry structure
Industry Description NTBF group
NTBF
1 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products ;Man-
ufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and
botanical products
88 61
2 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manu-
facture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Manu-
facture of other transport equipment; Building and repair-
ing of ships and boats ; Manufacture of aircraft and space-
craft;
235 132
3 Manufacture of office machinery and computers; Manu-
facture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; Manu-
facture of radio, television and communication equipment
and apparatus; Manufacture of medical, precision and op-
tical instruments, watches and clocks;
272 141
4 Research and development; Other Business activities 465 179
5 Computer and related activities 168 96
Total number of Observations: 1288 609
LTBF Group
LTBF
6 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 42 23
7 Manufacture of textiles 61 21
8 Manufacture of wood and wood products; manufacture of
pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing;
65 35
9 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nu-
clear fuel; Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
89 48
10 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 179 59
11 Fishing; mining and quarrying; Mineral products; Furni-
ture; other industries; Waste collection, treatment and dis-
posal activities; materials recovery; Other services
243 132
12 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles
and motorcycles
133 50
13 Transportation, storage ; Financial and insurance activities 137 89
14 Communication services 16 13
Total number of Observations: 965 470
32
